Jordan River Water Disputes and the Road to the Six-Day War

Jordan River Water Disputes and the Road to the Six-Day War

Water has long been a strategic asset in the Middle East, often serving as both a lifeline for development and a catalyst for conflict. In the years leading up to the 1967 Six-Day War, the Jordan River basin became a primary flashpoint between Israel and its Arab neighbors. What began as a struggle over irrigation and resource management evolved into a series of military confrontations that significantly destabilized the region.

The Struggle for Water Infrastructure

In July 1953, Israel began constructing the intake for its National Water Carrier, a massive project designed to transport water from the north to the arid south. The initial construction site was located at the Daughters of Jacob Bridge (Gesher B'not Ya'akov), situated in a demilitarized zone north of the Sea of Galilee. This move prompted an immediate response from Syria, which deployed armed forces and opened fire on the engineering sites.

Despite a 1954 United Nations resolution supporting the resumption of work, the USSR vetoed the measure. Consequently, Israel relocated the intake to its current position at Eshed Kinrot on the north-western shore of the Sea of Galilee.

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The Johnston Plan and Unilateral Development

In 1955, an attempt was made to establish a multilateral approach to water management known as the Johnston Plan (or Unified Plan). Although the plan was never formally ratified, both Israel and Jordan agreed to operate within the water allocations it prescribed. This period saw the development of two major projects: Israel's National Water Carrier and Jordan's East Ghor Main Canal.

Jordan began designing the East Ghor canal in 1957 as part of the more ambitious Greater Yarmouk project. This comprehensive scheme included the construction of dams on the Yarmuk River (Mukheiba and Maqarin) for storage and electricity, as well as various pumping stations and flood protection facilities. Construction began in 1959, with the first sections becoming operational by 1961 and further sections by June 1966.

The Headwater Diversion Plan

By 1964, Israel began withdrawing 320 million cubic meters (MCM) of water per year via the National Water Carrier. While this volume was within the limits of the Johnston Plan, it sparked intense political alarm among Arab states. At a January 1964 summit in Cairo, the Arab League viewed the diversion of water as a threat to Arab existence and a tool to enhance Israel's capacity to absorb immigrants at the expense of Palestinian refugees.

To thwart the Israeli project, the Arab states launched the Headwater Diversion Plan in 1965. Rather than a direct military attack, they sought to divert the sources of the Jordan River—specifically the Hasbani and Banias rivers—across the Golan plateau and into the Yarmuk River, where the water would be stored behind the Mukhaiba dam.

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Escalation to Military Conflict

Israel viewed the diversion project as an infringement of its sovereign rights. Estimates suggested that the plan would have deprived Israel of 35% of its intended withdrawal from the upper Jordan, representing one-ninth of the country's total annual water budget. In response, the Israeli army launched a series of strikes against the diversion works in Syria during March, May, and August of 1965.

These strikes triggered a "prolonged chain reaction of border violence." Between 1964 and 1967, incidents escalated from artillery exchanges and tank battles to full-scale air strikes deep inside Syrian territory in April 1967. This cycle of hostility over water rights is widely regarded as a major contributing factor to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in June 1967.

Key Facts

  • National Water Carrier: Israel's project to move water from the Sea of Galilee to the south, withdrawing 320 MCM/yr by 1964.
  • Headwater Diversion Plan: An Arab League effort starting in 1965 to divert the Hasbani and Banias rivers to prevent them from reaching Israel.
  • Water Impact: The diversion plan would have reduced Israel's upper Jordan water withdrawal by 35% (1/9th of its annual budget).
  • Johnston Plan: A 1955 failed ratification attempt at multilateral water management that nonetheless provided a framework for water quotas.
  • East Ghor Main Canal: Jordan's primary irrigation project, part of the larger Greater Yarmouk project.
Comparison of Major Water Projects (1950s-1960s)
Project Name Primary Actor Main Objective Key Outcome/Status
National Water Carrier Israel Transport water from north to south Operational; 320 MCM/yr withdrawal
Headwater Diversion Plan Arab States Divert Hasbani and Banias rivers Thwarted by Israeli military strikes
East Ghor Main Canal Jordan Irrigation via the Yarmuk/Jordan basin Completed in stages (1961-1966)
Johnston Plan International/US Multilateral water allocation Not ratified, but used as a quota guide

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the National Water Carrier?

The National Water Carrier was an Israeli infrastructure project designed to pump water from the Sea of Galilee in the north to the southern regions of the country for irrigation and domestic use.

Why did the Arab states attempt to divert the Jordan headwaters?

The Arab states aimed to prevent the Jordan headwaters from reaching Israel to thwart the National Water Carrier and limit Israel's ability to support a growing population and absorb immigrants.

How did the water dispute contribute to the Six-Day War?

The dispute led to a cycle of border violence, including artillery fire and air strikes between Israel and Syria from 1965 to 1967, which escalated into the full-scale war in June 1967.

What was the significance of the Johnston Plan?

Although it was not officially ratified, the Johnston Plan provided a set of water quotas that both Israel and Jordan initially agreed to follow, allowing for the development of their respective water projects.

Which rivers were targeted in the Headwater Diversion Plan?

The plan focused on diverting the Hasbani and Banias rivers across the Golan plateau and into the Yarmuk River.

References

  1. Seliktar, Ofira (June 2005). "Turning Water into Fire: the Jordan River as the Hidden Factor in The Six Day War". The Middle East Review of International Affairs. 9 (2). Archived from the original on 2010-01-13. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  2. Wolf, Aaron T. (1998). "Principles for confidence-building measures in the Jordan River watershed". In Kobori, Iwao; Glantz, Michael H. (eds.). Central Eurasian Water Crisis: Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas. United Nations University Press. ISBN 978-92-808-0925-1. Retrieved 2023-06-24. In July 1953, Israel began construction on the intake of its National Water Carrier at the Daughters of Jacob Bridge (Gesher B'not Ya'akov) north of the Sea of Galilee and in the demilitarized zone. Syria deployed its armed forces along the border and artillery units opened fire on the construction and engineering sites (Cooley, 1984, pp. 3 and 10). Syria also protested to the United Nations and, although a 1954 resolution for the resumption of work by Israel carried a majority, the USSR vetoed the resolution. The Israelis then moved the intake to its current site at Eshed Kinrot on the north-western shore of the Sea of Galilee (Garbell, 1965, p. 30). … In 1964 Israel began withdrawing 320 MCM/yr of Jordan water for its National Water Carrier… In 1965, the Arab states began construction of their Headwater Diversion Plan to prevent the Jordan headwaters from reaching Israel. … The Israeli army attacked the diversion works in Syria in March, May, and August of 1965. These events set off what has been called 'a prolonged chain reaction of border violence that linked directly to the events that led to the [June 1967] war' (Safran cited in Cooley, 1984, p. 16). Border incidents continued between Israel and Syria, triggering air battles in July 1966 and April 1967 and, finally, all-out war in June 1967.
  3. Gat, Moshe (2003). Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964–1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War. Praeger Publishers. p. 101. ISBN 978-0-275-97514-2. Retrieved 2023-06-24. Nasser, too, assured the American undersecretary of state, Philip Talbot, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnson [sic] Plan.
  4. Murakami, Masahiro (1995). "Appendix C. Historical review of the political riparian issues in the development of the Jordan River and basin management". Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East: Alternative Strategies. United Nations University Press. ISBN 978-92-808-0858-2. Retrieved 2023-06-24. The initial diversion capacity of the National Water Carrier without supplementary booster pumps was 320 million m³, well within the limits of the Johnston Plan. … Shortly before completion of the Israeli Water Carrier in 1964, an Arab summit conference decided to try to thwart it. Discarding direct military attack, the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwaters. … According to neutral assessments, the scheme was only marginally feasible; it was technically difficult and expensive. … Political considerations cited by the Arabs in rejecting the 1955 Johnston Plan were revived to justify the diversion scheme. Particular emphasis was placed on the Carrier's capability to enhance Israel's capacity to absorb immigrants to the detriment of Palestinian refugees. In response, Israel stressed that the National Water Carrier was within the limits of the Johnston Plan. … The Arabs started work on the Headwater Diversion project in 1965. Israel declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights. According to estimates, completion of the project would have deprived Israel of 35% of its contemplated withdrawal from the upper Jordan, constituting one-ninth of Israel's annual water budget. In a series of military strikes, Israel hit the diversion works. The attacks culminated in April 1967 in air strikes deep inside Syria. The increase in water-related Arab-Israeli hostility was a major factor leading to the June 1967 war.
  5. Shlaim, Avi (2001). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. Penguin Books. pp. 229–230. ISBN 978-0-14-028870-4. Retrieved 2023-06-24. In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo. The main item on its agenda was the threat posed by Israel's diversion of water from the north to irrigate the south and the expected reduction in the water supplies available to Syria and Jordan. The reaction of the summit to this threat was deadly serious. The preamble to its decisions stated, 'The establishment of Israel is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And since the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic, and social aspects, so that if the necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel.'